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The Books and Literature Section of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation 
normally reviews books that have been published within the last twelve months. 
However, the Yearbook is also committed to honoring the scholars that have led to the 
growth and development of the Alternative Dispute Resolution field. Roger Fisher could 
properly be considered a foundational scholar in the field of negotiation. Fisher was a law 
professor at Harvard law school, and published extensively on the topic of negotiation 
during his tenure.
1
 Additionally, Fisher served as the director of the Harvard Negotiation 
Project, and the Conflict Management Group; organizations devoted to studying and 
facilitating negotiations as diverse as custody agreements to international peace 
agreements.
2
  While all of Fisher’s professional accomplishments are noteworthy, Fisher 
is probably most famous for being one of the co-authors of the foundational work, 
Getting to Yes.
3
 Getting to Yes is arguably one of, if not the most famous, works on the 
topic of negotiation.
4
 Sadly, Roger Fisher died on August 25, 2012 at the age of ninety.
5
  
As the calendar rapidly approaches the one-year anniversary of Fisher’s passing, 
the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation has found it fitting to honor Fisher’s 
contributions to the field of Alternative Dispute Resolution by reviewing the first edition 
of Getting to Yes. While Getting to Yes is thirty years old, this literature review will 
proceed like any other. That is, this review will explore its strengths and weaknesses.
6
 
There has certainly been a great deal of scholarship on the topic of negotiation in the 
thirty years since the first publication of Getting to Yes, and the continuing influence and 
legacy of the work is impressive. Seasoned negotiators will likely recognize tactics they 
have been using with great success for decades. Relatively new negotiators will find a 
thoughtful and creative approach to getting past the seemingly omnipresent “no” of 
negotiation, and learn how to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution that satisfies the 
underlying needs and interests of all the parties. Make no mistake, Getting to Yes is not 
some miracle framework that guarantees success in every negotiation, but it is without 
question, a useful starting point for ensuring an effective negotiation.  
                                                     
*
 Kevin Schock is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2014 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1
 Associated Press, Roger Fisher, 90, Prof Co-Wrote Best Selling Book on Negotiation, CHICAGO SUN 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/obituaries/14768476-418/roger-fisher-90-prof-co-
wrote-best-selling-book-on-art-of-negotiating.html.    
2
 Id.  
3
 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton, 1 ed. 1981).       
4
 See, LYNN DURYEE & MATT WHITE, 50 ESSENTIAL TOOLS FOR THE ADVANCED PRACTITIONER 12 
(Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2012) (In their introduction, Duryee and White write, “Getting to Yes by Roger 
Fisher and William Ury has been the definitive text on negotiation theory since its publication thirty years 
ago, and it remains a masterpiece”).  
5
 Associated Press, supra note 1.  
6
 Where appropriate this review will examine other scholarly works, and contrast the claims of those 
works with the claims asserted in Getting to Yes.  
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Structurally, Getting to Yes is broken into three distinct parts, labeled: the 
problem, the method, and “yes, but.”
7
 Within each of these sections, there are chapters 
devoted to smaller topics, ranging from core principles of the proffered method, to 
strategies for dealing with obstinate players. At 150-pages, the book is long enough to be 
thorough, but short enough to remain manageable. The brevity of the book is sure to be 
appealing to an otherwise busy practitioner.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The authors of Getting to Yes begin their introduction by acknowledging that the 
universe of negotiation is vast. William Ury and Roger Fisher write, “[e]veryone 
negotiates something every day . . . Negotiation is a basic means of getting what we want 
from others.”
8
 However, the mere fact that most people are involved in some form of 
negotiation on a daily basis does not mean that everyone is equally proficient in 
bargaining; negotiation is a difficult skill.
9
 The authors point out that in approaching 
negotiation, most people find themselves being drawn to one of two ways of bargaining: 
“soft” or “hard”.
10
 The “soft” negotiator seeks to escape the conflict associated with 
negotiation and attempts to reach an agreement as quickly as possible. Conversely the 
“hard” negotiator sees negotiation as some sort of battle of wills, and attempts to “win” a 
negotiation through the sheer force of personal resolve
11
 These two styles represent the 




Fisher and Ury offer a third way of negotiating; a method that seeks to combine 
the positive traits of both the “hard” and “soft” negotiation styles.
13
 The method the 
author’s advocate is referred to as, “principled negotiation.”
14
 Principled negotiation is a 
style that attempts to decide issues based on the merits; it requires to parties to look for 
                                                     
7
 This book review intentionally omits the introductory section of the book, as it does not meaningfully 
expound on the substance of the text.  
8
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at xi.     
9
 Id. at xii. See also, James Boskey, Blueprint for Negotiations, 48 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 8-10 (December, 
1993) (Discussing the omnipresence of negotiation in everyday life, and the way in which certain people 
are able to employ negotiation skills to greater effect than others). 
10
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at xi.  See also, Boskey, supra note 9 (Boskey describes a similar 
dichotomy in negotiation style, however he uses the labels “competitive” and “cooperative.” Boskey’s 
description of the competitive negotiator describes a person who takes extreme positions, uses argument as 
their main negotiation tool, and seeks to impose their desires onto the other party. Conversely, the 
cooperative negotiator is open in sharing information, uses logic as their main negotiation tool, and tends to 
shy away from taking extreme positions. The difference between Fishers’ and Boskeys’ labels seems to be 
semantic and not substantive).  
11
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at xi.   
12
 Id.   
13
 Id.  
14
 Id.; see also Alex J. Hulder, Discovering Agreement: Setting Procedural Goals in Legal Negotiation, 
56 LOY. L. REV. 591 (2010). (Hulder describes problem-solving negotiation, which seems to be relatively 
similar principled negotiation. One of the tenants of problem solving negotiation is a recognition that 
“cooperation and competition always coexist in negotiation. This assumption stems from the recognition 
that all trade is both cooperative and competitive. Similarly, principled negotiation attempts to balance, and 




mutual gains, and demands that when interests conflict, the resolution be based on some 
fair, independent standards.
15
 The purpose of principled negotiation is to allow for a party 




Getting to Yes is ultimately about the method of principled negotiation, and it’s 
core, underlying tenets. Fisher and Ury promise that the principled negotiation method 
has a wide application, capable of being employed with equal success in situations as 
diverse as resolving a dispute over what movie to see, to military arms control 
negotiations.
17
 The promise of a greater chance of success in negotiations, and broad 
application ultimately encourages the reader to move beyond the introductory pages, and 
explore what principled negotiations is really about.  
II. THE PROBLEM 
A. Don’t Bargain Over Positions 
Fisher and Ury begin the first major part of Getting to Yes by arguing that the 
problem with the way most people negotiate, is that they spend their time bargaining over 
particular positions, rather than focusing on the underlying needs that are driving the 
position.
18
 According to the authors, positional negotiation is a particularly ineffective 
approach to bargaining.
19
 Fisher and Ury suggest that a method of negotiation can 
properly be judged by three criteria: whether the style ultimately produces a wise 
agreement; whether it is efficient at arriving at an agreement; and whether it improves, or 
at least maintains, the relationship between the negotiating parties.
20
 
According to the authors, positional bargaining tends to produce unwise 
agreements.
21
 When employing a positional negotiation strategy, negotiators tend to pay 
more attention to their bargaining position, and spend less of their energy trying to 
address the actual underlying needs of the parties.
22
 Furthermore, a negotiator’s ego can 
become attached to a particular position in such a way that movement away from a 
                                                     
15
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at xii.  
16
 Id.  
17
 Id. at xiii.  
18
 Id. at 3. (The authors suggest that the best example of this type of negotiating is the sort of dickering 
that people engage in when attempting to settle on the appropriate price for an antique).  
19
 Id.; see also Michael Palmer, Problem Solving Negotiation – What’s In it For You and Your Clients, 
25 VT. B.J. 21 (September 2000). (Palmer provides a laundry list of ways in which positional bargaining 
leads to inefficiencies. Palmer writes, “Positional bargaining favors deception and manipulation. It 
encourages bluffing. It places undue emphasis on the “value of the case” solely from the perspective of an 
eventual verdict and what it will cost to obtain. It erodes the credibility of the negotiators by forcing them 
to make an early commitment to an unrealistic number in order to work their way up or down to the 
number they really have in mind . . . [Additionally], positional bargaining throws the players into a one-
dimensional frame of demand and offer (usually of dollars) without regard to how the parties might 
otherwise help each other satisfy their respective interests at a low cost to the one and high value to the 
other. In other words, positional bargaining tends to be highly inefficient, some might even say wasteful.”).   
20





 Id. at 5.  
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previously stated position threatens the self-esteem of the negotiator.
23
 Additionally, 
arguing over positions is usually inefficient; positional bargaining encourages parties to 
use tactics that will ultimately stall agreement, including the taking of extreme positions 
and stonewalling. Furthermore, positional bargaining puts the parties at risk of damaging 
their relationship.
24
 According to Fishy and Ury, “Anger and resentment often result as 
one side sees itself bending to the rigid will of the other while its own legitimate concerns 




According to the authors, positional bargaining suffers from at least one 
additional defect; it is ineffective when there are multiple parties involved in a 
negotiation.
26
 It is possible for multiple parties to rally around a position by way of 
coalition.
27
 Once a position becomes entrenched amongst a group of people, it becomes 
harder to shift from that position; namely because a greater number of people are invested 
in that position, and there is an element of community pressure encouraging coalition 
members to stand firm in their positions.  
After describing the variety of problems associated with positional negotiation, 
Fisher and Ury offer their alternative: principled negotiation (which is sometimes referred 
to as negotiation on the merits).
28
 The method of principled negotiation describes the 
procedural strategy of negotiation.
29
 While some might believe that the substantive 
provisions of a negotiation are the most important issues to be settled, the procedure by 
which a negotiation occurs are the “rules of the game” and will ultimately guide the 
substantive outcome.
30
 Fisher and Ury state that at the most basic level, the method of 
principled negotiation can be reduced to four points.
31
 First, a person using principled 
negotiation will separate the people from the problem being resolved in negotiation.
32
 
Second, the focus of discussion is on the underlying interests of the parties involved, 
rather than on specific positions.
33
 Third, parties in negotiation should generate a variety 
of possibilities before deciding on a resolution.
34
 Finally, where the parties are unable to 
come to some sort of consensus on a particular issue, principled negotiation requires that 
the resolution of the dilemma be based on some sort of objective standard.
35
 The authors 
remind their readers that the four basic components of the principled negotiation method 
                                                     
23
 Id.   
24
 Id. at 7. 
 
25
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 7 (While preservation of a relationship might not seem particularly 
important when thinking about negotiation as an isolated event, it is rarely the case that negotiation happens 
in isolation. Parties have past histories, present relationships, and the possibility of future interactions. 
Thus, thinking about negotiation without simultaneously thinking about the effects the negotiation will 
have on the relationship is like spending all of your money as you make it, and saving no money for 
retirement).  
26
 Id.    
27
 Id.    
28
 Id. at 10-11.   
29
 Id. at 10.  
30
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 10.   
31
 Id.    
32
 Id. at 11.    
33
 Id.  
34
 Id.    
35




are relevant throughout the entire life cycle of a negotiation. In other words, the 
principled negotiator should keep in mind the four core principles of the method during 
the planning, analysis, and actual discussion phases of a negotiation.
36
  
III. THE METHOD 
While Fisher and Ury briefly introduced the method of principled negotiation in 
both the introduction, and their discussion of “The Problem,” the authors provide a 
tremendous amount of detail about the method by devoting an entire chapter to each of 
the four core principles of principled negotiation in the second major part of Getting to 
Yes. 
A. Separate the People from the Problem 
As introduced above, the first core tenant of principled negotiation is to “separate 
the people from the problem.”
37
 At the most basic level, this principle recognizes that 
negotiations are conducted by people with “emotions, deeply held values, different 
backgrounds and viewpoints . . . who sometimes behave in unpredictable ways.”
38
 The 
failure to treat a fellow negotiator as a human being can risk the success of the 
negotiation by undermining whatever personal and professional relationship might 
exist.
39
 Additionally, the first core principle recognizes that personal relationships and 
personalities have a tendency to become entangled with the underlying issues of a 
negotiation.
40
 Thus, in order to effectively negotiate, one must prepare to deal with the 
underlying relationship of the parties,
41
 in addition to the actual substance of the 
negotiation.
42
     
The authors of Getting to Yes argue that the “people problem” can be understood 
by thinking in terms of three basic categories: perception, emotion, and communication.
43
 
                                                     
36
 Id. at 12.  
37
 Id. at 10-11.   
38
 Id. at 19; see also Peter Reilly, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Mental Models: Theory that Leads to 
More Effective Dispute Resolution, 10 NEV. L.J. 433, 437 (2010). Reilly further demonstrates just how 
important it is to consider the complex emotions that people deal with, particularly in the context of 
resolving a dispute. Reilly argues that recognizing emotional complexity, and becoming proficient at 
working with such intricacies can make dispute resolution easier.   
39
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 20; see also Nancy A Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 
87 MARQ. L. REV. 753 (2004). (Welsh describes the importance of relationships between negotiators as a 
major factor in determining whether a negotiation will be successful and perceived as having been fair. 
Welsh writes, “Research reveals that negotiators’ aspirations and moves will be significantly influenced by 
the culture and context within which they are negotiating . . . and most intriguing of all, their sense of 
connection to each other.”).  
40
 There may be no clearer example than that of the custody dispute. Potentially embittered by the 
breakdown of some sort of spousal relationship, parties may look at the issue of custody as a conflict 
between individuals. In reality, the problem to be solved in a custody dispute is the adequate division of 
parenting time. An overt focus on personal “baggage” will only cloud the fair resolution of the dispute, and 
perhaps lead to further damage to an already fractured relationship.     
41
 The authors label this relationship issue, “the people problem.”  
42
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 21.  
43
 Id. at 22.   
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The underlying assumption is that if a party knows of the types of challenges posed by 
the “people problem” they can be more effective at managing the way such issues effect 
the rest of the negotiation. Fisher and Ury begin discussion the concept of perception by 
stating that conflict is not necessarily a function of objective reality, “it is ultimately the 
reality as each side sees it that constitutes the problem in a negotiation.”
44
 Thus, to be 
effective in negotiation, one must adequately understand the perceptions of the other 
party. The authors urge their readers to be empathic, arguing, “the ability to see the 
situation as the other side sees it . . . is one of the most important skills a negotiator can 
possess.”
45
 In addition to developing one’s capacity to “see the other side,” the authors 
warn negotiators to refrain from projecting their fears and insecurities on to the opposing 
party.
46
 While it may be easy to blame the opposing side for the problem, or to assume 
that the opposing side is acting in an uncharitable manner, this attitude will negatively 
color one’s perception of the entire negotiation, and is likely not an accurate 
understanding of the intentions of the other party.
47
 The authors suggest that one simple 




Emotion is the second category of the “people problem.” The authors state, “[i]n a 
negotiation, particularly in a bitter dispute, feelings may be more important than talk.”
49
 
As a result, it is imperative that an effective negotiator be in tune with their emotions, and 
the emotions of the other party.
50
 However, it is not enough to understand that certain 
types of emotions exist, the effective negotiator must seek to understand what is 
producing the emotions.
51
 Furthermore, it is wise practice to make emotions explicit; the 
authors write, “Making your feelings or theirs an explicit focus of discussion will not 
only underscore the seriousness of the problem, it will also make the negotiations less 
reactive, and more proactive.”
52
  
                                                     
 
44
 Id. at 23.  
45
 Id. at 23-24 (The authors point out that seeing the other side necessarily requires the reservation of 
judgment. In working to understand an opponent’s argument, one must let go of their own intuitions and 
feelings regarding the issue).  
46
 Id. at 25-26.   
47
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 25. 
48
 Id. at 26.   
49
 Id. at 30.   
50
 Id.; see also Clark Freshman, Yes And: Core Concerns, Internal Mindfulness, And External 
Mindfulness for Emotional Balance, Lie Detection, and Successful Negotiation, 10 NEV. L. J. 365, 372-77 
(2010). (Freshman points out that it is possible to improve one’s emotional intelligence (the ability to 
recognize, and accurately identify emotions of others based on their expressions) with a little bit of training. 
According to Freshman, this is a function of the relatively few human emotions (7 distinct emotions, to be 
specific) that humans actively display).  
51
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 30. 
52
 Id. at 32. 
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The last category of the “people problem” pertains to communication. The ability 
to communicate effectively is one of the most important capabilities of a negotiator.
53
 
However, there are three problems that commonly hinder communication in negotiation. 
“First, negotiators may not be talking to each other, or at least not in such a way as to be 
understood.”
54
 Additionally, even if a negotiator is speaking directly to the other party, 
the other party may not be hearing what is said because they are busy cultivating a 
response.
55




The authors suggest a variety of ways to address problems associated with 
communication. The authors first suggest using active listening.
57
 Active listening 
benefits all parties by making sure the message that was communicated was clearly 
understood.
58
 Additionally, when speaking, the authors recommend that one speak about 
themselves, and not about the other party.
59
 Fisher and Ury write, “[A] statement about 
how you feel is difficult to challenge. You convey . . . information without provoking a 
defensive reaction.”
60
 One of the most interesting solutions for improving communication 
involves the usage of physical positioning.
61
 The authors suggest that sitting on the same 
side of the table, and facing a physical representation of the problem at hand (such as a 
copy of a disputed contract, a chart, or even a blank piece of paper) will help parties think 
of themselves as partners in the solving of a dilemma, rather than as adversaries.
62
 The 
subtext is that parties are more willing and able to effectively communicate with a partner 
in a shared venture than they are with someone they actively perceive as an adversary.  
Fisher and Ury’s explanation of the first core tenant of the principled negotiation 
method persuades the reader of the importance of distinguishing the relational aspect of a 
negotiation from the substantive provisions. In many instances, the relationship of the 
parties will extend beyond their participation in the instant negotiation; as such, the value 
of being able to manage the “people problem ” is of paramount importance.  
While Fisher and Ury offer a variety of specific ways in which the “people 
problem” can be managed, it seems as if their advice can be reduced down to the 
                                                     
53
 Id. at 33. (The authors go as far as saying that without communication, there can be no negotiation);  
see also Kevin Arvuch, Culture as Context, Culture as Communication: Considerations for Humanitarian 
Lawyers, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 391 (2004) (Arvuch describes the way in which culture, and a lack of 
cultural awareness can have profound effects on negotiations. While Arvuch’s article is primarily focused 
on “humanitarian lawyers” – cultural competency is an increasingly large component of competent 
communication. Even “main street lawyers” would do well to improve their ability to communicate by 
improving their cultural competency).  
 
54
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 33.  
55
 Id. at 34.   
56
 Id.    
57
 Id.   
58
 Id. at 35.  
59
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 35. 
 
60
 Id. at 37.  
61
 Id. at 39.  
62
 Id. (It seems to me that at least some of the subtext of this point is that seemingly insignificant 
details (like physical positioning) may have greater importance than at first glance. Thus, the decision to 
remove one's jacket, to actually roll up one's sleeves, or to loosen a necktie may have effects that are not 
readily identifiable. As a result, the most effective negotiator will have to be mindful of even the seemingly 
minor personal decisions they make, and determine whether the decision to "roll up one's sleeves" was a 
net gain or loss).  
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fundamental importance of treating your “opponent” with respect. The wide variety of 
advice Fisher and Ury offer demonstrates that respect is a broad, multifaceted concept 
that is situational, and variable. In dealing with fellow negotiators, one must seek to be 
aware of how they are trying to show respect; and whether that message is being received 
and reciprocated.   
B. Focus on Interests, Not Positions 
The second primary tenant of the principled negotiation method is the 
requirement that negotiators be willing to focus on interests, not positions.
63
 According to 
Fisher and Ury, “[t]he basic problem in negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in 
the conflict between each side’s needs, desires, concerns, and fears.”
64
 A person’s needs 
and desires are their interests; positions are the ideas that someone decides on to 
effectuate their interests.
65
 Focusing on interests is more effective than focusing on 
position for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, “for every interest, there usually exist 
several possible positions that could satisfy it.”
66
 Additionally, the authors point out that 
in any conflict, parties usually have many more interests in common than the ones that 
are in conflict. These non-conflicting interests may give rise to creative solutions, and 
serve as a foundation for building a better relationship.  
In order to focus on the interests of the other party, a negotiator must be able to 
identify what those interests actually encompass. The interests underlying a position are 
likely to be complex and numerous, and it is entirely possible that a party may have 
inconsistent interests.
67
 The effective negotiator must put themselves in the shoes of the 
other negotiator, and ask about why that negotiator is taking a certain position, and why 
they are not taking other potential positions.
68
 The effective negotiator must recognize 




A good place to start the process of identifying interests is to look to basic human 
needs. Basic human needs are those concerns that motivate all people; examples include: 
security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition, and control over one’s 
life.
70
 The authors write, “[n]egotiations are not likely to make much progress as long as 




                                                     
63
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 41; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). (Meadow’s description of 
“problem solving negotiation” is similar to principled negotiation. Most noticeably, each approach requires 
negotiators to find the underlying needs and interests of the parties. Meadow’s discussion of interests 
provides greater detail than Getting to Yes on the subject of how to determine and rank the underlying 
needs of the parties).  
64
FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 42.  
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at 43.   
67
 Id. at 45.   
68
 Id.  
69
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 48-49.  
70
 Id. at 49-50. 
71
 Id at 50.  
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Once the basic human need interests have been identified, it is perfectly 
appropriate to openly acknowledge, and explain one’s interests to the opposing party.
72
 
The authors state that it is important to be specific in explaining one’s interests; detail 
provides a more nuanced picture of the interest and makes the interest seems legitimate.
73
 
However, it would be unwise for a negotiator to spend the entire duration of their 
negotiation focusing on their own interests; the effective negotiator must acknowledge 
the interests of the other side as part of the problem to be addressed.
74
 
While the method of principled negotiation consistently advocates for flexibility, 
it does allow for a certain amount of rigidity when it comes to the protection of one’s 
interests. Fisher and Ury write, “It may not be wise to commit yourself to a position, but 
it is wise to commit yourself to you interests. This is the place in a negotiation to spend 
your aggressive energies.”
75
 An overt focus on interests, with each party pushing hard for 
their own interests, may lead to exceptionally creative and mutually advantageous 
solutions.
76
 The authors emphasize this point by reminding their readers that they should 




Fisher and Ury remind their readers that no matter how hard they are fighting for 
their interests, they must not channel that passion in a way that demonstrates a lack of 
respect, or indicates a personal attack.
78
 The authors write: 
Fighting hard on the substantive issues increases the pressure for an 
effective solution; giving support to the human beings on the other side 
tends to improve your relationship and to increase the likelihood of 
agreement. It is the combination of support and attack which works; either 
alone is likely to be insufficient.
79
 
The above quotation does a nice job of summarizing, and combining the first two tenants 
of the principled negotiation method offered in Getting to Yes. There is an often used 
movie quote where a business deal sours, and one party feels jaded: “Its not personal; its 
just business.” Fisher and Ury remind their readers that, in negotiations, there is always 
an element of both. The substance of the negotiation must be separated from the “people 
problem,” but each “problem” must be attended to. Focusing only on substance, or only 
on the “people problem” will lead to agreements that unwise, ineffective, and inefficient.  
                                                     
72
 Id. at 50-51.  
73
 Id. at 51.  
74
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 52-53. 
75
 Id. at 55.   
76
 Id. at 57.  
77
 Id. at 56. (Fisher and Ury write specifically, “Do not let your desire to be conciliatory stop you from 
doing justice to your problem”).  
78
 Id.  
79
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 57.  
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C. Invent Options for Mutual Gain 
Once a negotiator begins focusing on interests, as opposed to positions, the 
universe of possible solutions rapidly grows.
80
 The ability to think creatively about 
potential solutions is one of the most important skills a negotiator can possess.
81
 
However, creatively thinking about solutions may not be a particularly natural feeling for 
a negotiator, most people usually believe that they know the correct solution to the 
resolution of a dilemma: their personal view.
82
 However, this mentality can inhibit the 
type of openness that is needed for the most successful resolution of a negotiation.
83
  
Fisher and Ury explain that there are four main obstacles that prevent the parties 
from considering a larger universe of possible options.
84
 First, parties tend to judge 
possible solutions too quickly; second, parties tend to search for the “single” answer; 
third, parties tend to assume that their universe of negotiation is closed, and they are 
unwilling to pursue creative solutions; and fourth, parties tend to minimize the 
importance of their oppositions interests.
85
 
In order to overcome the barriers preventing parties from generating the number 
of options they will need in order to be successful in their negotiation, Fisher and Ury 
provide a variety of suggestions.
86
 One such technique is to “separate the act of inventing 
options from judging them.”
87
 One way to invent new options is to conduct some sort of 
brainstorming session.
88
 In a brainstorming session, members of the group must feel free 
to invent ideas without pausing to consider whether they are possible or impossible.
89
 The 
underlying notion is that criticism stifles creativity; but it is only creativity that will 
generate the types of solutions that will lead to a successful negotiation. Ordinarily, the 
generation of ideas is done on an individual basis, but Fisher and Ury urge the readers to 
consider brainstorming with the other side.
90
 The authors acknowledge that there is some 
risk inherent in brainstorming with the other side, but suggest that the advantages may 
outweigh the risks
91
 Fisher and Ury write, “joint brainstorming sessions have the great 
advantages of producing ideas which take into account the interests of all those involved, 
of creating a climate of joint problem-solving and of educating each side about the 
concerns of the other.”
92
 
                                                     
80
 Id. at 58-59.   
81
 Id. at 58.  
82
 Id. at 59.  
83
 Id.    
84
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 59. 
85
 Id. at 59-62. 
86
 Id. at 62. (Fisher and Ury provide four types of solutions, unfortunately due to spatial constraints, I 
will only be able to discuss two of their techniques. The complete list of techniques is: separate the act of 
inventing options from the act of judging them; broaden the options on the table rather than look for a 
single answer; search for mutual gains; and invent ways of making the opposing decisions easy).  
87
 Id.  
88
 Id. at 63.  
89
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 63.   
90
 Id. at 65. 
91
 Id. (The authors point out that there is the risk that a party will say something that prejudices their 
interests, even if adequate rules have been established for the brainstorming session).   
92
 Id.   
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Another way to generate options is to be deliberate about looking for mutual gain. 
Fisher and Ury are optimistic that in every negotiation, there is almost always the 
possibility of a mutual gain.
93
 In order to find options where mutual gain is a possibility, 
negotiators must be willing to look towards shared interests as the basis for producing an 
agreement.
94
 According to the authors, shared interests lie latent in every negotiation, and 
a focus on these shared interests will likely make the bargaining process more pleasant 
and productive.
95
 It is possible that the shared interests of the parties may be based on 
some sort of difference.
96
 For example, one party may care more about the present effect 
of a negotiation, whereas the other party cares more about the future effects; this situation 
demonstrates that differences may be primed for mutual gain.
97
 The resolution of the 
negotiation could give the present minded party a deal that is immediately satisfying, but 
less desirable in the long term. Conversely, the future minded party would receive a 
resolution that is not presently satisfying, but will pay dividends in the future. Each party 
leaves having had at least one of their interests satisfied.  
Fisher and Ury’s suggestion that parties look for mutual gain is not particularly 
innovative. To some extent, searching for mutual gain is something that many people do 
intuitively; one needs to look no further than the concept of carpooling to understand that 
people think in terms of mutual gain, even in the monotony of everyday life. 
Additionally, the suggestion that parties “generate options before criticizing them” is not 
particularly original. However, Fisher and Ury did not promise that every single one of 
their suggestions would be innovative, they simply promised an effective method.  
D. Insist on Objective Criteria 
The last core tenant of the principled negotiation method is “insist on objective 
criteria.”
98
 As discussed above, arguing based on positions tends to pit the parties against 
one another on the basis of will, which is an ineffective method of resolving disputes.
99
 
When trying to reconcile divergent interests in a negotiation, it is more effective to insist 
that objective criteria be used to resolve a dispute.
100
  Fisher and Ury write, “The more 
you bring standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit to bear on your particular 
problem, the more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise and fair.”
101
  
Advising someone to use “objective criteria” does little if there are multiple kinds 
of objective criteria that might be used to reach different results.
102
 The touchstone in 
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selecting objective criteria should ultimately be fairness to both parties; furthermore, the 
criteria chosen should be “both legitimate and practical.”
103
 Additionally, the objective 
criteria used in resolving the dispute should not apply solely to one side; both parties 
must be impacted by the usage of fair, objective criteria.
104
 Furthermore, when a party 
insists that an agreement must be based on objective criteria this does not mean that the 
criteria used will only be the criteria advanced by that party.
105
 The selection of criteria to 
resolve the dispute is a responsibility that is shared by both parties; if the parties can’t 
agree on what criteria will be applicable they should seek the advice of a neutral third 
party in cultivating the criteria.
106
  
As a final point, Fisher and Ury point out that a negotiator should be somewhat 
suspicious if the opposition is hesitant to work to create objective criteria to solve the 
dilemma. In fact, some negotiators may try and apply pressure to escape having to decide 
the merits of the case based on objective criteria.
107
 This pressure may take the form of a 
“bribe, threat, manipulative appeal to trust, or a simple refusal to budge.”
108
 Fisher and 
Ury command their readers to refrain from yielding to such pressure. If a party is 
unwilling to budge on their rejection of objective criteria, then the negotiation is, in 
effect, over.
109
 What remains is “a choice like the one you face when you walk into a 




IV. YES, BUT… 
A. What if They are More Powerful? 
It is not always the case that parties have equal power in a negotiation.
111
 Thus, it 
is important to discuss how one can negotiate if the other party has more power. Fisher 
and Ury write, “In response to power, the most any method of negotiation can do is to 
meet two objectives: first to protect you against making an agreement you should reject 
and second, to help you make the most of the assets you do have.”
112
 One way of 
protecting oneself during negotiation is to develop a bottom line, but Fisher and Ury warn 
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their readers that adopting a bottom line may have more risks than rewards.
113
 A bottom 
line may be too rigid, will likely inhabit imagination, and will probably be set too high.
114
 
Rather than use a bottom line, Fisher and Ury encourage their readers to develop a “Best 
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. (BATNA)”
115
 Knowing one’s BATNA allows a 
party to be more flexible in exploring imaginative solutions, and one can get a pretty 




 Developing a BATNA is important if one seeks to increase their negotiating 
power.
117
 “Generating possible BATNAs requires three distinct operations: (1) inventing 
a list of actions you might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; (2) improving 
some of the more promising ideas and converting them into practical options; and 3) 
selecting . . . the one option that seems best.”
118
 This advice is particularly useful, 
because it requires a negotiator to not only seek to learn more information about their 
options, but also demands that they improve their options so as to improve their overall 
negotiating position.  
 It is also very important to recognize that the other side also has their own 
BATNA, and to consider how the opposing negotiator’s BATNA may affect 
negotiations.
119
 If a negotiator determines that the other side has a very attractive 
BATNA, this will alter the way in which they proceed with negotiation. Additionally, the 




 Fisher and Ury cannot overstate the importance of determining, and developing 
your BATNA. Having a good BATNA allows the parties to negotiate on the merits, and 
allows for a greater amount of bargaining power, even if the other side is more 
powerful.
121
 The authors conclude the chapter with an important reminder: “Developing 
your BATNA not only enables you to determine what is a minimally acceptable 
agreement, but will probably raise that minimum. Developing your BATNA is perhaps 
the most effective course of action you can take in dealing with a seemingly more 
powerful negotiator.”
122
   
B. What if They Won’t Play 
Next, Fisher and Ury address how to deal with a situation where the opposing 
negotiator does not want to negotiate based on the merits of the situation.
123
 Fisher and 
Ury suggest three approaches for focusing an opposing party on the merits of a dispute: 
first, you can concentrate on the merits, rather than positions, and hope the other party 
                                                     
113
 Id. at 102-103.   
114
 Id. at 102-103.   
115
 Id. at 104. (BATNA for short).   
116
 Id. at 104-105.   
117




 Id. at 109.    
120
 Id.     
121
 Id.  at 110-111.   
122
 FISHER & URY, supra note 3, at 111.  
123
 Id.  
435 
 
decides to do the same; second, you could employ a third party neutral (mediator); or 
third, a negotiator could employ negotiation ju jitsu.
124
  
Fisher and Ury explain that negotiation ju jitsu is the art of deflecting the attacks 
of a person who insists on using positional bargaining, and directing their energy back 
towards the merits of the dispute.
125
 The attacks of a person who refuses to negotiate on 
the merits will usually occur in one of three ways: the forceful assertion of their own 
position, attacking your ideas, and making personal attacks.
126
  
Negotiation ju jitsu requires that one does not attack the positions of the other 
party, even when the other party is asserting their undesirable position forcefully.
127
 
Instead, the effective negotiator must merely treat the asserted position as one possible 
option.
128
 Additionally, a negotiator should welcome the opposing parties attacks on their 
positions.
129
 The opposing parties attacks on a negotiators position provides insight into 
that parties’ desires and interests.
130
 Lastly, when personal attacks occur, it is wise to let 
them occur without any sort of defense. It may be valuable to let the opposing negotiator 
blow off a little steam, instead of defending oneself, Fisher and Ury suggest that one 
should simply recast a personal attack as an attack on the problem.
131,132
 
C. What if they Use Dirty Tricks? 
The last substantive chapter of Getting to Yes is devoted to dealing with persons 
who refuse to negotiate on the merits, and attempt to advance their agenda through the 
use of tricky bargaining.
133
 Tricky bargaining encompasses the use of lies, psychological 
abuse, and pressure tactics.
134
 The authors suggest that most people just put up with these 
kinds of tactics. While simply ignoring such tactics may work in some instances, more 
than often, simply ignoring the use of “tricky bargaining” will fail.
135
 The second most 
common response to tricky bargaining procedures is to respond in kind.
136
 Responding in 
kind is ineffective because it turns the negotiation into a contest of wills. Rather than 
simply ignoring the problem, or responding in kind, Fisher and Ury suggest that their 
readers engage in principled negotiation about the negotiation process.
137
 The use of 
principled negotiation to craft a fair negotiation process is no different than the principle 
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used to resolve the substantive disputes of a negotiation: separate the people from the 
problem; focus on interests not positions; invent options for mutual gain, and insist on 
objective criteria in resolving disputes.
138
 
Having already spent a great number of pages discussing the principled 
negotiation method, Fisher and Ury choose to explore types of tricky bargaining 
tactics.
139
 According to the authors, such tactics can be broken into three categories: 
deliberate deception, psychological warfare, and pressure tactics.
140
 The remainder of the 
chapter is spent discussing these kinds of tactics, and the way in which principled 
negotiation can be used to diffuse their effectiveness.  
Methods of deliberate deception include misrepresentations as to facts, authority, 
or intentions.
141
 One of the best ways to protect against deliberate deception is to refrain 
from being too trusting.
142
 Fisher and Ury write, “Unless you have good reason to trust 
somebody, don’t.”
143
 This simply means that a party should ask for evidence and verify 
the assertions of the other party, not that you should assume the other party is a liar. If a 
party suspects that their opponent has no intention of honoring whatever agreement is 
reached at the end of negotiation, they should take care to build compliance features into 
the language of the agreement.
144
 The inclusion of compliance features will be of little 
worry to someone who is actively invested in creating a workable and lasting agreement, 
but will force a person with dubious intentions to risk adverse action under contract 
theory should they not comply with the language of the negotiated agreement.  
The concept of “psychological warfare” includes situations where one party 
deliberately puts the other in a stressful or uncomfortable situation, makes personal 
attacks in an attempt to weaken the other parties resolve, or employs the classic good-
guy/bad-guy technique.
145
 The usage of “psychological warfare” can be diffused in many 
situations simply by calling attention to one’s perception that the technique is being 
used.
146
 Naming the technique will allow one party show the other party that they are 
aware of the tactic, and refuse to be influenced by it; or if the psychological pressure one 
is experiencing was caused by accident, to have the situation rectified.
147
  
Fisher and Ury explore even more “tricky bargaining” techniques and the ways in 
which a “principled negotiator” can respond to such tactics in the final pages of the 
chapter. Overall, the theory about how to respond to tricky bargaining is similar to the 
theory of the book; depersonalize the usage of the tactic, and refuse to continue 
negotiating until the other party is willing to decide the issue on the merits, devoid from 
any positional frills and gimmicks.  
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Fisher and Ury conclude Getting to Yes by offering their readers three final 
points.
148
 First, the authors tell their readers that the substance of their book is not meant 
to be new.
149
 Fisher writes, “There is probably nothing in this book which you did not 
already know at some level of your experience. What we have tried to do is to organize 
common sense and common experience in a way that provides a usable framework for 
your thinking and acting.”
150
 Second, the authors remind their readers that reading 
Getting to Yes is merely a starting point in becoming a good negotiator.
151
 Skill is not 
acquired from reading, but through conscious practice.
152
 The last concluding point in 
Getting to Yes concerns the topic of winning.
153
 The authors remind the reader that, 
“winning” in the context of Getting to Yes, is procedural not substantive.
154
 Fisher writes, 
“The thing you are trying to win is a better way to negotiate – a way that avoids you 
having to choose between the satisfaction of getting what you deserve and of being 
decent. You can have both.”
155
 
The conclusion of Getting to Yes provides the reader with a snapshot of what 
Fisher and Ury were ultimately trying to provide. It is against these goals that Getting to 
Yes should be evaluated. Overall, Fisher and Ury succeed in providing a well-organized 
and balanced method for approaching negotiation that seems intuitive at times. Focusing 
on the underlying needs/desires of the parties, treating fellow negotiators with respect, 
searching for opportunities for mutual gain, and insisting on fair criteria for the resolution 
of disputes are not revolutionary ideas, but they are ideas that are easy to forget when 
locked in the intellectual and emotional strain of a particularly intense negotiation. 
Having a principled method, like the one advocated for by Fisher and Ury, can help a 
negotiator be sure that they are constantly using the seemingly intuitive suggestions that 
will allow for a greater chance at a successful negotiation.  
Fisher and Ury also make clear that reading Getting to Yes is merely a starting 
point in the process of becoming a good negotiator. This recognition is particularly 
important as it would be easy for the authors to fall into the trap of stating that they have 
all of the answers. Instead, the authors offer Getting to Yes for what it is: a tool for 
improving one’s skills as a negotiator. In the end, Getting to Yes does not offer much in 
the way of traditional academic theory. The authors offer no citations to other academic 
sources and the book is entirely devoid of empirical research. The authors rely entirely on 
their own (albeit, impressive) experience in crafting the “principled negotiation” method. 
Yet, what the book lacks in terms of academic rigor, it makes up for in practical 
application. Nearly every page of the book includes some sort of example or some model 
language for introducing/implementing a particular kind of strategy. Personal experience 
suggests that the most difficult part of applying any sort of “method” is being able to 
recognize when application of the method would be appropriate, and what language 
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should be used. In this regard, Getting to Yes is exceptional. By focusing primarily on 
practical application, Fisher and Ury have ensured that Getting to Yes could be one of the 
most frequently referenced books on a negotiator’s bookshelf.  
Finally, Fisher and Ury remind their readers that the promise of Getting to Yes is 
not providing a way for the reader to get everything they want, but providing a method 
for a fair negotiating process.
156
 Getting to Yes offers no magical incantation, no formula 
of words that will allow the reader to move an otherwise obstinate negotiator to a more 
favorable position. By focusing on process rather than substantive results, Fisher and Ury 
found a way to ensure that all persons, in situations across the negotiation spectrum, 
could use their method.  
Getting to Yes is a highly practical, at times entertaining, but always informative 
look into the world of negotiation strategy. Variations on the “principled negotiation” 
method have risen since the time of the original publication of the book, but the original 
version of Getting to Yes stands the test of time. For new students of negotiation, reading 
Getting to Yes may feel like an introduction to a new and very nuanced universe. For 
seasoned negotiators, reading Getting to Yes may be like visiting an old friend: she has a 
lot of stories that you have heard before, but they are good stories, and somehow, the 
lesson you take away from her words is different each time.   
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